Archive for category Philosophy

What I Think of Ayn Rand (Old Comment Elevated to a Post)

Ayn Rand was nothing more than a bad novelist who produced monotonous, barely readable prose–I mean, seriously, she needed 90 pages to say, essentially, “always act as selfishly as possible.”

Her philosophy–essentially an argument for organizing society around individual selfishness–barely carries the intellectual heft of the stoned midnight discussions typical of college sophomores. She spent her life promoting this ideal mostly so she could go around doing as she pleased and hurting everyone she encountered without feeling guilty.

We should all consider enlightened self interest as we make our way through the world, but Rand’s notions of the supremacy of individual rights make no sense unless you live in a world where everyone makes exactly the same claims to justice and these claims never conflict.

She compounds the silliness by claiming the objective truth of this idea–as if the broad range of human social relations she experienced in her lifetime, including societal reaction to her sex life and extramarital affairs, gave her no hint that human values depend on interaction and discourse, not objective truths.

Except perhaps on planet Stoned Sophomore, where both Ayn Rand and John Galt lived.

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Natural Kinds, Social Kinds, and Rights

[UPDATE: I should have credited Alexander Wendt with the concepts of natural kinds and social kinds I discuss in this post.  See Social Theory of International Relations, Part I: Social Theory. My apologies, professor.  I hope I at least added a bit of analysis with my discussion of whether rights are social or natural kinds.]

Americans talk a lot about rights (defined as a just claim or title, whether legal, prescriptive, or moral).  Some we have written down as specific limits on the power of government, such as prohibitions against infringement on a “right to keep and bear arms.”  Others remain less clearly defined yet just as vigorously claimed, like the right to freedom of movement or the “pursuit of happiness.”  We talk about “active rights” to assert our agency in certain realms (e.g., speech, assembly), and “passive rights,” which create duties for others to give or permit something.  We also distinguish between positive rights (to a good or service) and negative rights (to non-interference).  However we lay our claims to them, rights help define proper action and just institutions.

For some, the force of our rights claims and the definitions of justice we use them to reach depend in no small part on their sources.  If a creator endowed humans with specific rights, or if the nature of humanity confers them, individuals have more powerful claims against others, and the rights framework creates an a priori assumption of justice.  Rights that depend on human concepts of right and wrong developed through discourse, on the other hand, provide more limited protection for individuals and a definition of justice more subject to change.

In this post I will argue that rights are a social construct of inter-subjective understandings shared by humans, and do not arise from nature, whether or not metaphysical.  I will do this by first making a case that rights are social, not natural kinds, and then outlining their changing nature.  In a later post I plan to discuss gun rights in this context, since proponents link them to a foundational right to life. Read the rest of this entry »

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