Archive for category Norms and Social Construction

McDonald v. Chicago

At the Founding, the Second Amendment was a Federalism issue.  Madison and the other Federalists wanted to create a powerful central government after their experience with the Articles of Confederation.  But the new Constitution included troublesome language, some of which appeared to put the Federal Government in charge of the state militias by giving Congress the power to “organize and discipline” them, and to “govern” them when federalized.  State officials worried that Congress might use these powers to disarm their militias.  This particularly concerned Southern legislatures who relied on state militias for managing the slave population.

To secure the necessary votes for ratification in the State legislatures, the Founders protected the power of “the people” to “keep and bear arms.”  Ratifying officials almost certainly thought of this clause as protecting State power to arm a militia, since it was State legislatures, not voting citizens, they intended to placate.

If the original meaning of the Constitution is to protect this State power, then incorporating it against State governments makes no sense.  State governments by definition govern the Militia, and this would by definition include the power to disband them if necessary.

Given the introductory clause “A well-regulated militia,” the Second Amendment must be interpreted as either protecting the power of States to form militias (meaning a collective right) or the power of individuals to form ad hoc militias (meaning an individual right).  Many gun “rights” advocates support the latter view, and the Founders would certainly have intended to protect individual citizens against confiscation of firearms (though not necessarily their regulation) to protect their right to form militias.  In this event, the ruling gets it exactly right: States should have no more power to regulate gun ownership, and therefore private militia formation, than the Federal Government.  Given the current state of Constitutional jurisprudence, then, I think this was the correct conclusion under the law, though I think Thomas was on the most solid ground by using the Privileges and Immunity Clause instead of the 14th Amendment (for more on this see Scott Lemieux at LGM and Jonathan Turley at his blog).

This has interesting implications.  Note for example that if the Constitution protects the rights of citizen groups to form ad hoc militias for their own purposes, then the Klan arguably acted legally by forming armed groups to enforce Jim Crow laws and local customs.  Gun “rights” advocates, after all, argue for the “right” to intervene militarily against their elected government should they disagree with government policy.

In any event, McDonald has implications for an argument I made here at FBL back in January: that “a shift in normative paradigms about the social order (e.g, about the appropriateness of violence in society, or killing to protect property) could threaten the existence of a “right to keep and bear arms” as a shared understanding.”

Americans appear to be fairly evenly divided on the regulation of gun ownership, with little support for looser gun control laws.  Indeed, it seems like most Americans probably don’t think about gun rights or gun control laws very much, except when some event in the news brings it to their attention.  Note for example that the Columbine tragedy correlates with a very sharp increase in support for gun control laws, which returned to previous levels over time.

These polls require a grain of salt, since they are national polls, and some results suggest that views vary quite a bit from region to region, with support for regulating firearm ownership particularly high in big cities.  We can expect local populations and jurisdictions to have sharply divergent preferences with respect to the type and scale of gun regulation.  So I see two problems for gun “rights” advocates in this ruling.

First, it violates the Constitutional principle of Federalism and local control by further federalizing normative institutional structures with respect to the “rights” and privileges of citizenship.  Conservatives (especially Southerners) complain about this when the Court incorporates national standards for civil rights, religious expression, and the regulation of sex and marriage.  It is at least amusing to see a Conservative Court take a Warren Court approach to incorporation of a “right” conservatives consider crucial to liberty, and begs the question of whether this Court and other Conservatives would support incorporation of abortion rights against the states using similar arguments.  It also represents a paradigmatic shift to the right with respect to firearm regulation by forcing a libertarian view of gun “rights” on more liberal jurisdictions, and this can be expected to energize potential gun control advocates.

More importantly for my discussion of changing social norms and the protection of gun “rights,” this ruling should lead to nullification of the law challenged in the suit, as well as many others, as unconstitutional.  These laws exist because citizens demanded them, whether or not they work, and we can expect cities and states to work on formulating regulatory schemes which pass Constitutional muster.  Since the Court has said that limits on the right to keep and bear arms do exist, we can expect further regulation of firearms in many places even after incorporation.

This process will reopen a gun “rights” debate which Second Amendment proponents had largely won, and awaken previously quiet constituencies to this policy debate.  This is especially so if it leads to formation of ad hoc militia groups under looser gun control laws.  Where gun ownership becomes more pervasive and public, Americans who have little exposure to them and want them regulated could suddenly join a discussion they have previously ignored because it made little difference to them.  Figuring out how many Americans understand weapons, own them, and care about gun “rights” is problematic.  But it makes sense to think that gun advocates are more energized on the issue, and they should take care to avoid bringing gun control onto the policy agenda unnecessarily.

Eighty-two percent of Americans think gun control laws should stay the same or be made stricter.  This is a large constituency to arouse from slumber, and drastic changes, especially in large cities, could cause a backlash against gun ownership and gun “rights.”  For NRA members and gun “rights” advocates, this is already a salient voting issue–”I’m the NRA and I vote” is not a popular bumper sticker because of the cool logo.  Making gun control a salient issue for this 82% could backfire, and if looser gun control laws appear to cause in increase in crime, or simply expose Americans who don’t like guns and don’t want to be around them to people carrying weapons around all the time, it could become a salient issue for them, as well.

This is how laws–and norms–change.

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Force, Persuasion, Civilization, and Tiger Woods

Not long ago I made the case, in response to a claim by Markus Kloos, that human interaction depends on more than force and persuasion.  Shared normative understandings about behavior regulate human relations, I argue, not a series of dyadic attempts to regulate the behavior of others through reason or force.  Tiger Woods’ apology from Friday is instructive here:

“I stopped living by the core values that I was taught to believe in. I knew my actions were wrong, but I convinced myself that normal rules didn’t apply. I never thought about who I was hurting. Instead, I thought only about myself. I ran straight through the boundaries that a married couple should live by. I thought I could get away with whatever I wanted to. I felt that I had worked hard my entire life and deserved to enjoy all the temptations around me. I felt I was entitled. Thanks to money and fame, I didn’t have to go far to find them.

I was wrong. I was foolish. I don’t get to play by different rules. The same boundaries that apply to everyone apply to me. I brought this shame on myself. I hurt my wife, my kids, my mother, my wife’s family, my friends, my foundation, and kids all around the world who admired me.”

Note the framing of his behavior as violating “rules” and “boundaries” which make up the “core values” that someone taught Woods to “believe in.”  These values make up the framework within which human beings interact (in this case) sexually: once committed to marriage and family, husbands simply do not take multiple lovers.  It’s just not doneRead the rest of this entry »

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Force, Persuasion, and Civilization

In response to my expressed concern that placing “placing the safety and freedom of society in the hands of individuals harms us normatively by making collective action more difficult,” my new friend Bob referred me to “Why the Gun is Civilization” by Marko Kloos.  While somewhat interesting, I think Mr. Kloos greatly oversimplifies both the effect of introducing firearms into human interaction, and the nature of human interaction itself. Read the rest of this entry »

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Soviet and Maoist “Communism”

Since someone in comments challenged my assertion that neither the Soviet nor Maoist Chinese states were communist, I thought I would clarify my view on this.

By definition, communism refers to a stateless society in which the citizenry own the components of production, including land, resources, money, and labor in common.  The USSR and “Communist” China could therefore by definition not be communist, since they included a state apparatus.

Though these governments justified themselves as an intermediary step between capitalist and a communist society, I argue that they really existed only as a way to institutionalize the consolidation of wealth in the hands of elites.  This makes them authoritarian and tyrannical, perhaps, but it does not make them communist.

In a sense, the commenter has offered an example in support of my argument that social discourse matters.  Since he grew up on a social environment that classified these governments as communist, he refers to them so, whatever Engels, Marx, or anyone else says.  They were communist only in the sense that he believes they were.

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Norms, Framing, and Protecting Gun “Rights”

Last week, I posted an essay making a case that rights do not arise from nature, but depend on socially constructed understandings developed through human interaction and discourse.  Briefly stated, I argued that social concepts like rights do not distinguish various natural kinds from one another, and cannot be studied without regard to social relations among humans, among other points.  Since they depend on social relations for definition, rights must be a social construct.  To support this view, I pointed out that our concept of rights do not remain static, and vary across societies.  In this post I’d like to discuss how this applies to gun rights.

The social construction of rights depends on prevailing understandings about appropriate behavior in human interaction, as well as shared understandings about right and wrong, the value of human life, social ordering of political and economic behavior, competing concepts of justice, and an almost infinite variety of other components of social relations.  All of these things combine to make up prevailing norms and inter-subjective understandings that make up social reality, and if these understandings include a specific “right,” challenges to such a right would by definition come from marginal actors, and probably have little effect.  For example, few challenge rights to speech or religion in the US today, but most shrug off claims of a right to food or health care as illegitimate.

All of this matters to gun rights advocates because given that prevailing norms change, and they rightly worry that a shift in normative paradigms about the social order (e.g, about the appropriateness of violence in society, or killing to protect property) could threaten the existence of a “right to keep and bear arms” as a shared understanding.  The claim that society abridges a rights claim–that is, creates an injustice–by disarming those who wish to own and carry weapons has little meaning in a social framework where the right is not broadly recognized.  Some citizens might nevertheless claim such a right, and use violence to oppose its infringement, but since this in turn infringes on the strongly held beliefs of prevailing society, it would organize against the rights claim and quash the effort, as it would a person or group that went around kidnapping people today, claiming a right to own slaves.  This is true even if I am wrong, and rights are natural kinds.

Therefore, the justice of rights claims matters only to the extent that it empowers a minority to resist a majority without violence.  It has no bearing on the ability or power to resist disarmament, and actually only protects the “right” if society shares the moral principle.  This is one of the senses in which I claim that rights don’t exist unless humans manufacture them, and it means that puffing out the chest and rhetorically defending a right to gun ownership helps only to the extent that it perpetuates the social norms that support such a right.

Advocates, that is, might claim a moral principle, but this only has value as a rhetorical device in support of perpetuating the norm–discourse privileging some moral claims as “rights” over others helps to constitute the normative structure in a way that elicits support from large segments of society, even some who disagree with the behavior.  Firearm (speech, religion) rights survive, not because nature endows them, but because infringing them is something you just don’t do.  Others (e.g., right to food, shelter) have less normative power as justice claims because fewer people share the understanding of them as “rights,” whether or not they accrue naturally to humans.

This suggests that gun rights advocates who wish to preserve this norm should concentrate on rights discourse, and limit discussion intended to make fellow citizens afraid, such as quoting crime statistics, listing home invasion incidents, and carrying on the pretense that an armed citizenry can preserve liberty with a constant threat of rebellion.  Over time, changes in society which made these reasons obsolete could make firearms less useful, ownership less widespread (firearm ownership already trends down), and this argument less valuable.  And as technology advances and makes representative government much more inclusive (if only by growing a more educated population), the perceived need for the ability to rebel against it could wane.

Advocates of protecting Second Amendment rights won’t protect these rights with guns.  Discourse might work if used to frame gun ownership as a moral and civic good.  Focus on crime only increases incentives to solve the problem, and threatening rebellion only marginalizes advocates.  Thinking of gun rights in terms of social relations rather than as a natural individual right is the best hope of preserving gun rights for posterity.

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