I don’t know very much about Jason Corley, so I will resist the urge to evaluate whether he really understands the meaning of the terms “relativist” and “nihilist” when he uses them to describe my approach to marriage and abortion.  If by relativist he means that I dispute the idea that some truths are absolute, then I confess to the charge.  Indeed, I embrace the characterization, and do not find it insulting.  I am, however, no nihilist: I believe that values exist, that human society requires norms, rules, and laws, and that existence has meaning.  I just don’t believe that God defines them.

At any rate, I think he misses both of the points I tried to make.  With respect to marriage, he argues that because that institution regulates so much of our social interaction–by stabilizing relationships within family units–any challenge to it threatens traditional American society.  In making his case, Mr. Corley asserts that marriage has not evolved–that it remains the same institution across time.  I simply pointed out the demonstrable falsehood of this claim.  Since marriage has changed, defending what we call marriage today has nothing to do with protecting traditional values.  It is important to note here that Mr. Corley does not attempt to actually defend his assertion; instead he suggests that variation in marriage across societies makes no difference.  This is, of course, difficult to reconcile with this statement: “Marriage is not a evolving paradigm. It is the source of the historical role of the family as the basic unit of every civilized society.”  If marriage does indeed vary over time, and across societies, and yet still forms the foundation of “traditional society” it is not clear how simply adding a new variation (gay marriage) threatens the institution.  Mr. Corley could make this case by describing the mechanism of destruction that gay marriage would introduce to the institution, but he does not.  This suggests that he in fact prefers a particular ordering of society that requires a particular form of marriage and family.  Such an argument would not be wrong in its face, nor would it be trivial.  So I wonder why he does not make it.

Mr. Corley also seems to miss my point with regard to abortion.  I find the abortion question a simple one: when does life begin?  The State has no reason to interfere with a woman’s choice to terminate gestation unless the fetus has achieved personhood.  If this happens at conception, then abortion of any kind is murder, and murderers should be punished.  This is true without regard to the circumstances of conception.  Further, since both the mother and the doctor are complicit in this hypothetical crime, the state should sanction both equally.

Few abortion opponenents support this view, however.  Most would exempt the mother from punishment, and instead sanction the doctors performing the procedure.  Most also exempt mothers who became pregnant through rape.  This suggests that they don’t really believe that a fetus is a person–innocent, and deserving of state protection.

This is no circular argument: a fetus is either a person or it isn’t.  It makes no sense to argue that it is without supporting criminal sanctions for mothers who have them killed.  If you don’t support such sanctions, then you have created a different category of person, not quite deserving of full state protection from all agents that might do it harm.

Jason Corley has his own ideas about social order, traditional society, and how humans should interact.  This is, of course, how it should be.  I object only to his effort to use the State to force his world view on others, by priveleging heterosexuals over gays with regard to marriage (and therefore tax, inheritance, family structure), and by placing women in the sexual and reproductive roles he prefers.  He should make his case that this would improve society, but he will get more traction if he coherently addresses the actual arguments made by the other side.