In response to my expressed concern that placing “placing the safety and freedom of society in the hands of individuals harms us normatively by making collective action more difficult,” my new friend Bob referred me to “Why the Gun is Civilization” by Marko Kloos.  While somewhat interesting, I think Mr. Kloos greatly oversimplifies both the effect of introducing firearms into human interaction, and the nature of human interaction itself.

Kloos argues that human beings have only two ways to “deal with each other,” or interact: force or persuasion.  After defining civilization as a society in which “people exclusively interact through persuasion,” Kloos states that because guns remove “the disparity in strength, size, or numbers between a potential attacker and a defender” they remove “force from the [social interaction] menu,” thereby creating a civilized society whose members interact solely through persuasion.

Mr. Kloos makes several dubious assertions in this essay, and at least one which is simply factually wrong.  He suggests, for example, that because a physically stronger party could beat a weaker defender to death–that is, lethal confrontation is possible without firearms–the presence of guns do not make otherwise innocuous confrontations lethal.  Guns do not, of course, make every fight involving them a lethal one.  But introducing firearms into innocuous confrontations–the kind which would not otherwise have become lethal–certainly increases the chance that one party or the other might be killed.  Kloos asserts that this “works solely in favor of the weaker defender,” but it is not clear why only the physically weaker of the parties would think to carry a gun.  In any event, guns may change the dynamic of a confrontation from “size wins” to “surprise wins,” but it does not make all confrontations even.

Mr. Kloos also argues that disarming citizens grants a “force monopoly” to muggers, creating “automatic rule” by the “young, the strong, and the many,” painting a dystopian image of young, physically powerful muggers roaming the streets, hitting Grandma up for her Social Security check before she can get to the Kroger to cash it.  Of course, this hyperbolic statement assumes no other mechanism for protecting the weak than arming them, and it leaves the state entirely out of the equation.  Since the state maintains the real force monopoly, and exercises it through its security agencies, Mr. Kloos’ roaming muggers would have at least some competition.  Thinking otherwise depends on two contestable assumptions: that criminals could arm themselves despite a general firearms ban, and that the police are ineffective.  Given that most Americans do not go through daily life with a sidearm, and muggers do not roam free to do as they please, it seems that the natural experiment of American life refutes Mr. Kloos’ statement.

Finally, the writer makes the demonstrably false statement: “When I carry a gun, you cannot deal with me by force.”  Sorry, Mr. Kloos, but arming yourself does not take force off the table–it merely escalates the amount of force needed to bend your will.  And this gets to the flaw in the writer’s reasoning: “force” and “persuasion” are not separate techniques for interacting with other humans.  Force is simply a tool for persuading.

In fact, human interaction depends on overlapping “logics” of “appropriateness” and “consequences.”  Social understandings about appropriate behavior, institutionalized in social roles (e.g., parent child relationships, workplace norms), do the majority of this work: most people don’t go around robbing others, whatever the “force” calculation, because they share an understanding that this is inappropriate.  Instead, people follow rules they understand as natural, expected, and legitimate–they attempt to meet the obligations inherent in the roles and group memberships they take on.

Those who reject these rules–or self-identify with groups operating outside the prevalent social understandings of acceptable behavior–face the consequential logic.  Actors who do go around robbing each other face both normative and objective punishment.   But far more takes place as humans interact than a simple calculation of the distribution of force.  A prohibition on the general public carrying of firearms would not lead to “automatic rule” by the young and the strong because social understandings of appropriate behavior would continue to shame this behavior, and the logic of consequences would keep it at the margins, and far from automatic.

Civilization does not depend, at its core, on a single hand held weapon which evens one-sided confrontations.  Instead, shared understandings about appropriate behavior institutionalize identity, roles, and the rules and customs which guide our interactions.  This includes the regulation of violence through adjudicating institutions intended to resolve conflict peacefully.  We stigmatize violence outside of extreme situations, and we punish those who violate this norm.

We’re not in the state of nature any more, Mr. Kloos.